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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ing a motion for summary judgment. 6 However, there is a possi-
bility of injustice in denial as noted by Judge Clark:
"Refusal of summary disposal of a case may be a real hard-
ship on the more deserving of the litigants; since appeal does
not lie from refusal, as it does from the grant, the penalties
may be the severer. A court has failed in granting justice
when it forces a party to an expensive trial of several weeks'
duration to meet purely formal allegations without substance
fully as much as when it improperly refuses to hear a case at
all.",57
Ben R. Miller, Jr.
Reconventional Demand
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure makes several impor-
tant changes in the procedure concerning incidental demands.
One of the main incidental demands is reconvention,' which has
been uniformly defined in the Louisiana Codes of Practice as
"The demand which the defendant institutes in consequence of
that which the plaintiff has brought against him."'2 It would
appear that Louisiana adopted the reconventional demand from
the Spanish,8 although there are references to French legislation
on the subject.4
PLEADING
Under the Code of Practice of 1870 the reconventional de-
mand could be pleaded either in the answer to the principal
action or as a separate demand.5 If the reconventional demand
was incorporated in the answer, it was not considered a part
thereof, but as a petition setting forth a distinct cause of action.6
Thus the rules of pleading relative to the petition applied except
that it appears neither an answer nor exceptions to the recon-
ventional demand were permitted.7 Following the usual proce-
56. See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15(6) (2d ed. 1953).
57. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MIxN. L. REv. 567, 578 (1952).
1. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 374 (1870).
2. Ibid; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 374 (1825).
3. 2 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1825,
p. 6 4 (1937).
4. E.g., Agaisse v. Guedron, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 73 (La. 1824).
5. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 377 (1870).
6. Of. Woodward-Wight Co. v. Haas, 149 So. 161 (La. App. 1933).
7. This has been a frequently litigated subject with cases holding that excep-
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dure, the defendant in reconvention would wait until trial and
then object to the introduction of evidence under the reconven-
tional demand. 8 If the objection was well taken, the reconven-
tional demand usually fell due to the court's reluctance to allow
amendment.0
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure makes some change
with reference to pleading the reconventional demand. It re-
quires that an answer and exceptions be filed to the reconven-
tional demand,'0 which remedies the situation where the recon-
ventional demand fell because of a defect in pleading precluding
the introduction of evidence. Inadequacies can thus be cured be-
fore trial on the merits.
The new requirement that the defendant in reconvention file
an answer creates a special problem as to when the answer can
be filed. An answer to a petition may be filed at any time prior
to the confirmation of a default judgment against the defend-
ant." However, if this rule were applicable to the reconventional
demand, the plaintiff in reconvention would be at a disadvantage.
If he attempted to confirm his preliminary default judgment
prior to trial, he would probably be forced to offer all the evi-
dence that would be submitted on the trial proper by either
party. 2 On the other hand, if plaintiff in reconvention waited
to confirm the default judgment until the trial on the merits, he
would be faced with the possibility of an answer filed immediate-
ly before commencement of the trial raising defenses he would
be unprepared to meet. For this reason, the new Code provides
tions may be filed to the incidental demand, while others hold that exceptions are
not permissible. Cf. Loew's Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 227 La. 127, 78 So.2d 534
(1955) ; General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ross, 155 La. 545, 99 So.
443 (1924); Evans v. District Grand Lodge No. 21, GVOOF, 151 So. 664 (La.
App. 1933); cf. Woodward-Wight Co. v. Hanas, 149 So. 161 (La. App. 1933).
It seems that the majority rule was that answer and exceptions were not al-
lowed. See LA. CODE o' CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 852, Reporter's Comments (1960).
8. This is illustrated by cases involving the demand in compensation where the
evidence in support of the plea was objected to. Bernos v. Michel, 168 La. 468,
122 So. 584 (1929) ; Ouachita Nat. Bank v. McIlhenny, 169 La. 258, 125 So. 69
(1929). See also Loew's Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 227 La. 127, 130, 78 So.2d 534,
535 (1955), where the court stated: "If plaintiff had adopted the more regular
procedure of objecting to the introduction of any evidence in support of the recon-
ventional demand, we would not be presented with an appeal at this time."
9. Under prior law, it seems that amendment of an answer was not permitted
after the case was called for trial and the issues joined, and therefore it appears
that the courts were reluctant to allow amendment to an incidental demand when
the demand was subjected to exceptions at the trial. See Vicknair v. Terracina,
164 La. 114, 113 So. 787 (1927).
10. LA. CODE OF C.IVI PROCEDURE art. 1034 (1960).
11. Id. art. 1002.
12. Id. art. 1035, Reporter's Comments.
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
a. special rule for the answer to the reconventional demand, re-
quiring that it be filed before the taking of a preliminary default
by the plaintiff in reconvention. 18
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Reconventional demand, under the prior law and the new
Code, is triable only by a court having jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of the reconventional demand. An illustration is
Feahney v. New Orleans Railway & Light Co.,' 4 where the plain-
tiff brought suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans for the sum of $128.00 and defendant reconvened for
the sum of $46.00. The court disallowed the reconventional de-
mand on the ground that district courts had jurisdiction only
when the amount in dispute exceeded $100.00. Thus even though
a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the principal
action, the amount sought by reconvention must meet the juris-
dictional amount of the court or the demand will fall.
The same rule does not pertain with regard to venue, 15 since
the court having venue over the parties to the principal action
also has venue over the parties in the reconventional demand.18
REMOVAL OF LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF THE
RECONVENTIONAL DEMAND
Diversity and Connexity
Historically, one of the problems relating to the reconven-
tional demand involved the question of types of demands which
could be pleaded in reconvention. Under the original Code of
Practice of 1825, a defendant was allowed to institute a recon'
ventional demand only if it was necessarily connected with and
incidental to the principal action.17 Yet the meaning of the re-
quirement of connexity was never entirely clear from the juris-
prudence, since determination was made on a case by case basis.
Generally, however, it may be noted that connexity seemed to
13. Id. art. 1035. It should be noted that Article 1035 uses the language "judg-
ment by default." However, this refers to the preliminary default, as indicated
by the Reporter's Comments to this article.
14. 4 Orl. App. 277 (La. App. 1907).
15. The new Code replaces the term jurisdiction ratione personnae with the
term venue. Id. art. 41. See also Comment, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 182(1960).
16. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art, 377 (1870). The new Code contains no articles
which indicate a change with regard to the rule pertaining to venue.
17. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 375 (1825).
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depend on the similarity of the evidence used in the reconven-
tional demand with that used in the principal action. 18 Thus, it
has been held that there is no connexity between an action for
divorce on the grounds of separation for seven years and an
action for divorce on the grounds of adultery. 9 Yet, in a case
where the wife filed suit for separation on the ground of cruel
treatment and the husband reconvened for a divorce on the
ground of adultery, the reconventional demand was allowed.20
The court said that evidence of cruel treatment and evidence of
adultery are sufficiently connected to allow the latter to be raised
by way of reconventional demand.
In 1866, the Code of Practice of 1825 was amended to provide
that in cases where the connexity requirement was not met, the
defendant would still be allowed to bring a reconventional de-
mand where the parties reside in different jurisdictions. 2'
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure eliminates both the
connexity and the diversity requirements to the reconventional
demand and allows any action to be brought by reconvention. 22
Under the Code of Civil Procedure the reconventional demand is
apparently to a large extent a counterpart of the permissive
counterclaim under the Federal Rules,23 which provide for the
inclusion of as many causes of action as can properly be disposed
of in one suit, regardless of the fact that the actions do not arise
from the same transaction. 24 The Federal Rules recognize, how-
ever, that it would be impractical to require the courts to decide
all causes in one suit. Thus it is provided that if it appears to
the trial justice that the trial of the issues of the complaint will
likely be confused, complicated, or lengthened because of the
counterclaim, he is authorized to order a separate trial of the
18. See Landry v. Regira, 188 La. 950, 178 So. 502 (1937).
19. Dowie v. Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921).
20. Landry v. Regira, 188 La. 950, 178 So. 502 (1937).
21. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 375 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1886, No. 50.
22. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1061 (1960).
23. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 13(b). There are two types of counterclaims in federaljurisdictions: the compulsory and the permissive. If a defendant brings an action
that "arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing parties' claim, and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction" then such
action must be raised by way of counterclaim. Id. 13(a). Failure to do so results
in the action being considered res judicata. 3 MoonE, FEDERAL PuACTICE 28, 29(2d ed. 1953). Since Louisiana has never required that a defendant plead a cause
of action through the reconventional demand even if it does arise from the same
transaction, it must be concluded that the reconventional demand in Louisiana is
a counterpart of the permissive counterclaim of federal jurisdiction. See Dela-
houssaye v. Judice, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 251 (La. 1827).
24. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 13(b).
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
counterclaim. 25 The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure recog-
nizes the same need for some restriction and provides: "The
Court may order the separate trial of the principal and inci-
dental actions. '2
When the principal and incidental actions are tried separ-
ately, the Code of Civil Procedure allows separate judgments to
be rendered.27 This could give rise to a problem of having separ-
ate appeals from the two judgments, which appears undesirable
from the standpoint of efficient handling of litigation by the ap-
pellate court. However, the Code of Civil Procedure meets this
problem by providing that the court may withhold the signing
of the judgment on the action first tried until the second is com-
pleted.2 8
Reconvention and Compensation
One of the most important changes that the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure will make in the law of incidental demands is
to broaden the reconventional demand to incorporate the demand
in compensation. 29 Compensation, a separate incidental action
under the Code of Practice,'30 is a mode of extinguishing a debt
which takes place when both plaintiff and defendant are indebted
to each other in such a manner that one debt offsets the other
in whole or in part.31 However, the reconventional demand and
the demand in compensation are so similar that the redactors of
the new Code thought it unnecessary to have two separate
actions, especially in view of the removal of the connexity and
diversity requirements from the use of the reconventional de-
mand.32 In fact, in at least one situation there appears to have
been a definite overlap between the two. Thus, in the case where
the debt which the defendant pleads in compensation exceeds the
amount which plaintiff claims, and the defendant desires the bal-
25. Id. 13(i), 42(b).
26. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1038 (1960).
27. Ibid.
28. Id. art. 2083.
29. Id. art. 1062.
30. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 363 (1870).
31. Id. art. 366.
32. LA. CODE OF CIvi. PROCEDURE art. 1062, Reporter's Comments (1960). If
the demand in compensation were incorporated into the reconventional demand
before the requirements of diversity and connexity were removed from the recon-
ventional demand, instances might have arisen when compensation could not be
pleaded because of the requirement not being met. Removal of these require-
ments will remove the danger of limiting the demand in compensation.
224 [Vol. XXI
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ance, either the demand in compensation or the reconventional
demand would have been proper.83
The Civil Code provides that compensation takes place be-
tween two debts "which are equally liquidated and demand-
able. '34 When originally faced with the problem of "equally
liquidated" it was recognized that there were two policy factors
to consider.85 On one hand, if parties are mutual creditors, it
seems that neither should be permitted to demand or enforce pay-
ment from the other. Yet, if one debt was established beyond
controversy so that it could be judicially enforced immediately,
and the other was not judicially ascertained, it would seem un-
fair to suspend the execution of one until an examination was
completed of the other. Weighing these two factors the court
reached the conclusion that a debt should be considered "equally
liquidated" if it is susceptible of being speedily and satisfactorily
proved.36 Later cases, however, referred to a common law defi-
nition of "equally liquidated" and indicated that a claim is liqui-
dated where the amount is fixed by law or has been ascertained
by the parties.3 7 This required a greater degree of certainty as
to the debt than did the former interpretation and therefore was
more restrictive on the use of the demand in compensation.
By procedural changes in the new Code it is possible that this
restrictive substantive requirement may be avoided. Since the
broadened reconventional demand allows the defendant to assert
any action he may have against plaintiff regardless of diversity
or connexity,38 apparently a debt owed defendant by plaintiff
could be asserted by way of reconvention, whether or not that
debt be equally liquidated. It should be noted, however, that since
a defendant in reconvention will be allowed to except to the de-
mand,3 9 a debt which is not demandable can probably be stricken
by an objection of prematurity.
Joinder of Third Parties
Aside from the diversity or connexity requirement, another
restriction on the use of the reconventional demand under the
33. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 371 (1870). See Moore v. Hamilton, 16 La.
App. 630, 133 So. 790 (1931).
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2209 (1870).
35. Caldwell v. Davis, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 135 (La. 1824).
36. Ibid.
37. E.g., Moore v. L-amilton, 16 La. App. 630, 133 So. 790 (1931).
38. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1061 (1960).
39. Id. art. 1034.
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law prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure. was the
inability of the plaintiff in reconvention to bring necessary third
parties into the action. 40 This limitation resulted from a literal
interpretation by the courts of the article in the Code of Practice
defining reconvention as a demand which "defendant institutes
in consequence of that which the plaintiff has brought against
him."'41 Under this limitation, when the third person was an in-
dispensable party, the reconventional demand would fall. The
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure expressly eliminates this lim-
itation, so that third parties may be joined in a cause asserted
by way of reconvention when their presence is necessary for
complete relief.42 The source of this provision is similarly found
in the Federal Rules, where it is provided that persons not par-
ties to the principal action can be made defendants when relief
cannot be granted without their presence.43 This rule seems to
prevent an undesirable multiplicity of actions due to a technical-
ity, and should greatly enhance the use of the reconventional
demand.
The Action Matured or Acquired After Pleading
While there appears to be no case in point, it seems that
under the prior law, a defendant could not assert by way of re-
convention any action which was acquired or matured after de-
fendant had filed his answer.44 The new Code, however, allows
an action which is acquired or matures after the defendant files
his answer to be asserted by supplemental pleading with permis-
sion of the court.
45
It should be noted that the new Code provides that an inci-
dental demand, filed after the answer to the principal demand,
can only be done with leave of court and such leave can be grant-
ed only if the incidental action will not retard the progress of
the principal action.46 It seems, however, that this requirement
of non-retardation will not have to be met where the incidental
40. Lyons v. Fry, 112 La. 759, 36 So. 674 (1904).
41. Ibid.; LA. CODE 0 PRACTICE art. 374 (1870).
42. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1064 (1960).
43. FED. R. CIv. PRO. 13(h) provides: "When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in
the determination of a counter-claim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to
be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can
be obtained and their joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the
action."
44. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1066, Reporter's Comments (1960).
45. Ibid.
46. Id. art. 1033.
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action filed after the answer to the principal demand is one
which was acquired or matured after answer.
47
Effect of Dismissal of the Principal Action
Under the Code of Practice of 1870 a plaintiff could discon-
tinue his suit at any stage prior to the rendition of judgment 5
This provision caused considerable difficulty in situations where
a plaintiff decided to discontinue the litigation after the defend-
ant filed a reconventional demand. The basis for this difficulty
was the fact that since reconvention is an incidental demand, it
is, by definition, incidental to a principal action, and would ordi-
narily be thought to depend on the principal action for its ex-
istence.4 9 However, since such a ruling would detract from the
policy behind the reconventional demand, which is the expedient
handling of as many causes of action as possible in one suit, the
jurisprudence has developed the rule that a voluntary discon-
tinuance of the principal action does not defeat the reconven-
tional demand.50 Under the Code of Civil Procedure this juris-
prudential rule has been codified, with a view to ending any pos-
sible confusion on the point. Thus it is provided that: "If an
incidental demand has been pleaded prior to motion by plaintiff
in the principal action to dismiss the principal action a subse-
quent dismissal thereof shall not in any way affect the incidental
action." 51
The purpose of the new Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is
to clarify and simplify the rules of procedure in Louisiana prac-
tice. In the area of the reconventional demand this purpose
seems to have been accomplished through the important changes
that have been made.
Hillary J. Crain
47. Ibid. This article seems to except from its application the situation aris-
ing under Article 1066, sinceit provides: "An incidental demand may be filed
thereafter, with leave of Court, if it will not retard the progress of the principal
action, or if permitted by Articles 1066 or 1092" (Emphasis added.)
48. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 491 (1870).
49. Id. art. 362.
50. Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 135 So. 225 (1931) ; State e rel. John T.
Moore Planting Co. v. Howell, 139 La. 336, 71 So. 529 (1916) ; Alfonso v. Ruiz,
2 So.2d 480 (La. App. 1941).
51. LA. CODE OF CIViL PROCED U E art. 1039 (1960).
1960]
